Lavrov Introduction to K. Marx's "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

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Preface
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Abstract:[to K. Marx's "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction"]

P. L. Lavrov
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One of the most interesting literary questions is the study of the gradual development of the thought of great writers and thinkers, observing the first manifestations of those teachings that later, in a more complete and refined form, marked an epoch in the intellectual achievements of humanity. For modern socialists, there is hardly a writer or thinker who, in this regard, can compare in significance to Karl Marx. Therefore, one can only sympathize with the intention of the new Russian socialist group of publishers1 to begin the series of publications it is planning with a translation of one of the earliest works of Karl Marx: his "Introduction" to the proposed major work "From the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," an introduction published in the first (and only) issue of the review begun by Karl Marx together with Arnold Ruge in Paris, namely, the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher," herausgegeben von Arnold Rüge and Karl Marx; 1st and 2nd Lieferung; Paris, 1844. Zur Kritik der Hegel'schen Rechtsphilosophie, von Karl Marx, Einleitung, pp. 71-85.}. The interest of this publication is further enhanced by the fact that the aforementioned review is now a bibliographical rarity, and very few readers have ever had the opportunity to see this work of Marx's, even in the original German.
But before us is a work from a bygone era, and, moreover, it comes from the pen of a man who did not isolate himself from the world around him in his study, but was highly sensitive to external events and, by these events, called upon to think. Therefore, this work of Karl Marx's youth reflects many details of the struggle that marked the mid-forties, details now half-forgotten. To explain it, it is almost necessary to preface it with a few pages.
Here, first and foremost, the subject of the article requires explanation. It concerns Hegel's philosophy of right, but most Russian socialist readers (and even non-socialists) have only the

vaguest notion of Hegel in general and his philosophy, including his "Philosophy of Right." Long gone for Russians is the era of the 1940s, when enthusiastic young people in Moscow circles spent entire nights until dawn arguing over this or that Hegelian expression, when Bakunin wrote in the Gallic Annals under the pseudonym Elizar. Since then, the formulation of philosophical questions for most interested in them has changed significantly, and even the philosophical methods of German idealism have become archaeological legend. Meanwhile, the entire German-French Chronicle, co-edited by Karl Marx, is imbued with the traditions of Hegel's teaching, and even the opposition to this teaching, insofar as it is expressed in this publication, is conducted on the basis of Hegelian logical propositions and the methods of Hegelian dialectics. Let us dwell for a few minutes on this doctrine, which played a very significant role in the history of nineteenth-century thought, a doctrine which served as a starting point for the works of David Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach, for the preaching of Bakunin and Lassalle, and especially for the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. {Hardly any of the readers of these lines are familiar with my old work on "Hegelism," which appeared in "Library for Reading" in 1858 and 1859. Nevertheless, if such readers happen to find some discrepancy between what I wrote then and what I have expressed in recent years and am summarizing here, they will certainly remember that it would be a shame for me not to have learned anything since then. The name of Marx and his works were completely unknown to me then. I was not directly familiar with the philosophical works of Ludwig Feuerbach or Auguste Comte, nor even with the logic or political economy of John Stuart Mill. Nevertheless, I still do not renounce many of the ideas expressed in this, my earliest philosophical work.

Life provides man with the material of knowledge and understanding, desires and activity. Knowledge selects the most reliable facts and, in relation to them, arranges everything else in a hierarchy of the impossible, the improbable, and the more or less probable. Affects evoke a series of vital impulses, which in turn are arranged in a hierarchy of more or less attractive, more or less sexual.
A sensible, more or less elevating human dignity. To bring order to this material provided by life, classified by knowledge, and exciting us with emotions, a mental process of unification emerges, a striving for consistency in thought and life. Knowledge is built into science. Motives, inclinations, and emotions are grouped into a moral teaching, into a plan for social and historical activity. A general worldview encompasses all reliable, more or less probable elements of knowledge and understanding, and all the lower and higher elements of practical activity. This unifying thought, necessarily operating in all areas of knowledge and life, is philosophical thought. The product of unification, whether in a particular area or in a broad worldview, is the philosophy of that particular area or a philosophical system in general. To the extent that knowledge is higher, the more precise it is, and the task of life is the better all the circumstances are foreseen that can in one way or another promote or counteract the set goal, to that extent philosophy is higher, the more fully it embraces and better groups all the material supplied to it by thought and life, precisely in that mutual dependence and hierarchy of the elements of this material that science establishes in its latest acquisitions and morality in its highest ideals of personal and social life.
Knowledge grows and gradually gets rid of the fantastic and metaphysical elements that surround it and exist in it, but in every era one can still discover in the thought that calls itself

scientific, a greater or lesser number of these elements. Moral ideals, personal and social, also develop, struggling with habits, with narrow interests, with blinding affects, but in every era and for every person, the personal situation, the social environment and the events of history influence these ideals, strengthening or weakening these or those lower elements that penetrate into them. Therefore, in every era, philosophical worldviews, all the material of which is drawn from elements developed by the processes of knowledge and belief, from lower and higher affects, cannot but reflect the era in its concerns and in its aspirations, in its conquests and in its errors. Different currents of thought and life inevitably give rise to different theoretical worldviews and different practical teachings. Every philosophy that has achieved significant influence and dominance, is, of necessity, a reflection of some dominant currents in a given historical era. Such was German idealism in the era contemporary with the first French Revolution. Such, in particular, was Hegelism in the first third of our century.

For Europe, from the very beginning of modern times, the task was to move from medieval forms of civilization, primarily religious, to other forms, secular ones, and, moreover, in their distinction from ancient civilization, to forms corresponding to the enormous acquisitions of knowledge and technology that Europe could take advantage of in the 17th century, having in its past Columbus and Copernicus, gunpowder, printing, the successes of crafts in medieval guilds and oceanic navigation; to move to forms corresponding to the new political tasks developed by the struggle between the state and the church, lawyers and feudal lords, cities with barons and bishops, city guilds with patricians; to forms corresponding, finally, to the changes in the moral ideal that brought about in habits Christian theology, which demanded from church members not only the performance of public rituals, but also personal conviction, was the source of personal thought. The entire history of modern times consists of the effort to develop theoretical and practical elements of civilization that satisfy these requirements. Critical science with its precise methods comes forward to replace the dominance of church dogma and authoritative testimony. By the end of the 17th century, it had become fully established in the fields of mathematics, mechanics, and mechanical physics, and by the end of the 18th century, in chemistry, while simultaneously making significant advances in biology, laying the foundation for the successful development of psychology, and approaching the correct formulation of the tasks of sociology from various angles: from the standpoint of the struggle for the best political form and the most correct construction of legal provisions in codes; from the standpoint of the relationship of the individual to the social contract and of the citizen of an individual state to cosmopolitan ideas and sympathies; from the standpoint of the role of economic processes in social and state life; finally, from the standpoint of the relationship of the personal ideals of each era to the historical process that prepared it and is preparing within it a new era. English and American political writers, Beccaria and Ventham, Rousseau, the Encyclopedists and their followers, the Physiocrats and Adam Smith, Vico, Herder, and the cosmopolitan Enlightenment thinkers of all countries, consciously and unconsciously developed various elements of sociology in the form in which it was destined to become a priority among scientific tasks in our time.

But alongside this scientific elaboration of social issues, still very fragmentary and m
Rather than being methodical, these questions, in all their complexity, were posed by the process of history itself and demanded immediate solutions. Catholicism bequeathed to the new Europe a strong and powerful church organization, and on the eve of the modern era, it developed a new organ, the Jesuits, adapted to the new conditions of social struggle for

existence. The secular state, defending its independence from the church, was forced to endure a constant struggle for supremacy against this organization in Catholic territories, a struggle all the more difficult because in many cases the state could not do without the support of the very church it was fighting. In Protestant territories, the situation was different, and the danger was different. The church, in its main branches, subordinated itself to the head of state and became part of the latter, so that the state, which, by the nature of the new historical process, was destined to become increasingly secular, grafted religious thought and religious organization onto its body as inseparable elements. It was thus faced with an inevitable dilemma. Any state that remained a social form essentially imbued with a religious element would inevitably run counter to the historical current, would reach a comparatively low point in its development in its rivalry with other states, and would consequently risk its stability, even its very existence, in political competition. This danger was all the more significant because, imbued with a religious element, the Protestant state, even within its own territory, would be forced to regard as enemies all non-believers, all Protestant sectarians who deviated in one way or another from the state faith, and, finally, all free thinkers, whose number increased as scientific methods of thought spread and strengthened among the intelligentsia. On the other hand, any Protestant state that, in keeping with the general trend of modern European history, sought to become a secular state would, through this characteristic feature, exert an even greater influence on the life of the church, which was linked to it, the closer that link was. This church, while maintaining the appearance of a religious union, was bound to become increasingly imbued with elements of secular thought, increasingly losing its religious character. This process, in turn, was bound to lead, by the shortest route, to the extinction of the specifically religious element within the church and society itself, and to the final transformation of the new society into a purely secular one, which is precisely what modern history was heading toward. It goes without saying that the course of history could hardly be doubted on either of these grounds.

Where a schism between church and state arose on the basis of Catholicism, their struggle was bound to lead to more direct attacks by free thinkers against the religious element, in many cases with variable tolerance on the part of the state, or to a decisive decline in thought in those countries where (as in Spain) the state renounced its historical role and linked its fate with the support of Catholicism. But the struggle between church and state was bound, on this basis, to also produce a less stable state form, a more revolutionary character of history, since the church, in its experiences, constituted an element undermining the stability of secular state forms. Catholic countries were naturally destined to become centers for the preaching and dissemination of anti-religious thought in its most blunt and definitive form. Given the predominance of the class element over the state, these countries were destined to fall prey to internal religious discord, which could be exploited by unruly neighbors, as happened in Poland at the end of the 18th century, and as nearly happened in Germany in the first half of the 17th. Where the state element had already succeeded in sufficiently uniting territories and class elements, Catholic countries were destined to become the breeding grounds for the most frequent political revolutions, with the Church, with its strong organization, able to survive the most severe upheavals, time and again preparing the way for a period of reaction. Several revolutions in France, the Pronunciamento in Spain, the development of Carbonarism in Italy, the continuous series of upheavals in the Catholic republics of America, and finally the struggle of nationalities in Austria can serve as illustrations of the first half of this situation, just as the

Catholic reaction of the nineteenth century after the successful struggle against infame3 in the eighteenth and after the cult of reason at the end of that century provides a similar illustration of the second. On the soil of Protestantism, under the conditions of historical movement, the process of gradual conversion of the religious elements of society to secular ones had to naturally overcome, with the development of a hypocritical cover for this metamorphosis with a religious appearance and with the strengthening of the state bond of society. Not a single Protestant state took the soil of exclusive religiosity. Where, as in England and
In Scotland, Protestantism demonstrated the most resolute efforts to persecute non-believers, sectarians, and free thinkers. The habits of state tolerance, essentially religious indifference on the part of the state, became most firmly established. Whatever the sovereign's confession, recognized as dominant, the state became superior to religion, both dominant and dissenting. The dictates of personal conviction, so highly valued in Christianity in its opposition to the ancient ritual religions, became a completely secondary matter for the majority, since the secular law of the state was recognized as the most important guiding element of life. The state grew stronger, but at the expense of the moral strength of individuals, accustomed to compromises with their consciences and self-hypocrisy. On the one hand, it was precisely in Protestant states that the reverence in which several previous generations had grown up, when the object of this reverence was the highest representatives of the church, was especially clearly transferred to the sovereign as the head of the church. The almost religious veneration of legal forms and ancient ceremonial in England, the astonishing sincerity of admiration for representatives of authority that was and is observed in Germany, can hardly be considered products of this transference of the ecclesiastical element and the feeling of religious reverence associated with it to power in Protestant countries. On the other hand, as soon as history in Protestant countries moved toward the dominance of the secular element and the atrophy of the religious, while precisely the ecclesiastical significance of power compelled it—and, with the strengthening of the state element at the expense of the ecclesiastical, compelled society as well—to carefully preserve an outward respect for religious experiences, the desire for intellectual compromises was bound to flourish in these countries. Religious thought was forced again and again, while remaining religious in its forms, to seek agreement with secular elements, which were acquiring an increasingly undisputed dominance around it. There were two such elements: the state and secular science. The religious element of Protestantism entered into a compromise with the state quite simply, as we have just seen: the state became for it a new church, supported by the prevailing theology with spiritual forces and which, armed with a secular sword, was supposed to protect the primacy of the dominant confession over infidels, sectarians, and unbelievers. The ancient state, in which religion had already completely merged with political life, served as a model. But in this case, attention was paid to the very significant difference that the ancient religions were predominantly ritualistic and nationally exclusive, so that a foreigner often did not have the right to perform a religious-national rite, and this excluded propaganda; whereas Christianity was a religion that demanded personal conviction; Protestantism even advanced this doctrine of personal conviction and faith as its distinctive feature, and missionary propaganda, striving to spread every sectarian creed to all humanity, was an inseparable element of all Christian sects.
But compromise with science was more difficult, firstly because it demanded the same universal dominance as Christianity; secondly, because dividing their territories was less convenient and

became increasingly less convenient the broader the field of knowledge became and the more demanding the methods of scientific thought became. At first, when it came to mathematics, physics, and astronomy, it was still possible to separate the sphere of belief from the sphere of knowledge without much difficulty, although even here it was necessary to interpret the "word of God" with considerable constraints. Learned specialists, narrowing their thought in their work on a few carefully integrated problems, were not dangerous enemies in themselves, willing to compromise outside of these problems. But alongside them and among them, to the point that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish one from the other, were philosophers. Since the very essence of philosophy has always consisted in uniting, in one way or another, the entire material of knowledge, belief, and practical motives, modern philosophers could not avoid the question of the relationship of scientific problems and methods to religious beliefs. Scientific results had to be reconciled with theology, scientific methods with the products of Christian mythology and metaphysics. With each decade of modern history, new clashes and new difficulties arose. Theologians were indignant. More than once, they resorted to the "head of the church," to the "guardian of the faith," to secular authority, demanding protection for the "word of God," for the points of the catechism of the faith "recognized as dominant." Sometimes they succeeded in crushing the enemy in individual cases. But overall, they constantly suffered failure. The state was, it is true, the "guardian of faith," but it was first and foremost the guardian of secular interests, especially material interests. Science has proven to be such a strong source of technical inventions and

The material benefits that the state inevitably sided with its most innocuous elements, promoting and itself disseminating its elementary methods, could not help but promote the spread of its methods and habits of thought. But it was precisely in these methods and habits of thought that lay the most essential and dangerous enemy of religious thought. In this course of events, an overly harsh thinker could be imprisoned, a careless professor could be expelled from his chair, some unfortunate book could be burned, but in essence, scientific methods of thought and its scientific habits grew and spread. Philosophical worldviews, in their unifying work, were bound to become increasingly imbued with these methods and habits, while theology was bound to lose ground and yield. And it did yield.

At first, philosophy in England, with Bacon and his disciples, attempted to separate the territories of scientific-philosophical thought from religious-philosophical thought. But interaction with the more decisive philosophies of the mainland made this path impossible. The doctrine of sensualism grew out of the soil of empirical psychology, and it was from the school of Bacon's followers that that French group of enlighteners and encyclopedists developed, which proved the most determined enemy of all existing theologies and even religious thought in general. Protestant theology made concessions. It advanced the doctrine of rationalism. The "Word of God" remained the unquestioned authority, but attempts were made to properly interpret and understand it. Everything miraculous, everything supernatural, everything contradictory to scientific findings and new moral demands evaporated from it under the deft hands of interpreters. What remained was a mundane content that preserved the entire letter of the Old and New Testaments, but transformed Moses and Christ into completely vulgar figures, removing from religion precisely that which constituted its spirit. Everything that momentarily elevated the majority of undeveloped people to ideal spheres, creating fantastic helpers for man in the struggles and sorrows of life, when he felt powerless. In essence, rationalism was the

most positive rejection of any religious feeling, any religious element of thought, a completely definite realization in the realm of so-called theology of the demand for a historical transition to a purely secular civilization. But this rejection was mostly hypocritical, sometimes unconscious, which for the vast majority of people who did not go beyond the superficiality of doctrine, seemed a safeguard of religion, since neither the personalities of tradition nor sacred texts were subject to negation. Theology, allowing such a compromise, believed that it stood on a purely scientific basis and at the same time satisfied the demands of both the philosophers who rejected religious sentiment, and the majority, for whom it preserved the names and texts familiar to them.

But in all these respects, rationalist theologians were to be disappointed. They did not satisfy scientific demands, because the scientific method did not permit the arbitrary exclusion of all supernatural content from texts, while simultaneously admitting the authenticity of their factual content. Nor did it permit the psychological transference to the authors of sacred texts of the rationalistic thought process with which modern people approached these texts. Science demanded a critique of natural events and a critique of texts in accordance with the structure of thought and the time of their origin, just as it rejected supernatural events and supernatural revelations in texts. All those individuals who, although their thinking was insufficiently developed, still needed a religious frame of mind in the struggle of life were repelled by rationalistic commentaries that destroyed the entire ideal, elevating aspect of theology. The majority, content with familiar names and familiar texts, more readily followed, under the same compulsion of habit, the theologians of the old school, who repeated scholastic arguments without the slightest concern for reconciling them with the tenets of science or common morality. For this majority, just as for these theologians, the demands of a unifying philosophical thought were nonexistent.

Under these conditions, the storm of the First French Revolution approached, arrived, and passed over Europe. Alongside it, a reaction against the entire system of thought that had provoked it was brewing and arrived. But this reaction, in its strongest elements, was the unconscious heir of the very period against which it reacted and whose tasks it could not help but preserve in its thought and life.

The political revolution was suppressed by the dictatorship of the empire and then by the domination of Europe by the Holy Alliance. But before all governments, like inescapable phantoms or dangerous realities, stood all those questions about constitutions, about the rights of peoples, about freedoms of various kinds, which had been written in blood in the history of previous years.

The philosophy of the Enlightenment and the Encyclopedia

The Unitedists were filled with horror and disgust, for they readily saw in it the preparatory work and ally of the revolution. It was considered unscientific. The absence of ideal demands was indignantly pointed out in it. It was accused of misunderstanding history. But it had to be replaced by a new philosophy, and this philosophy faced the same questions, but even more acute. Science, whose methods had become even more rigorous and which, precisely in this era, produced a new generation of remarkable minds, demanded a place for itself: this was the time of Lavoisier and Monge, Lagrange, Laplace and Cuvier, Adam Smith and Ricardo. Religion in one form or another had to be given a place in philosophy, since the reaction arose especially on the basis of opposition to the Enlightenment's struggle against l'infâme and considered the

clergy of all denominations its allies. But a return to medieval scholasticism was impossible; the habits of scientific methods of criticism had already become largely ingrained; A new form of compromise between knowledge and theology had to be sought, bearing in mind the entire critical literature of the Encyclopedists and all the unsuccessful attempts of the rationalists. The new philosophy also demanded a place for elements previously overlooked or only given passing attention by unifying thought. As one of the early manifestations of the reaction against rationalist thought, which was preparing the explosion of the revolution, a poetic revival took place in Germany, which not only produced such paramount figures as Goethe and Schiller, but also surrounded them with a whole galaxy of lesser poetic luminaries and gave rise to a unique, romantic movement in Germany—a movement that sought to introduce into all areas of thought and life the process of fantasy that occurs in the free creativity of an artist. Moreover, questions of society in general and state in particular, which had played a rather insignificant role in the unifying thought of previous periods, when political activity was largely closed to thinkers, now, in the wake of the threatening and multifaceted experience of the French Revolution and its aftermath, could no longer fail to demand a place in philosophical systems. All these old and new conditions for the work of philosophical thought gave rise to that remarkable movement in the latter, which is designated by the development of German idealism. It primarily spanned exactly half a century, from the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 to Hegel's death in 1831.

The social standing of most of the participants in the German idealist movement strongly influenced its character. They, for a significant part, came from the families of Protestant pastors, developed among young people preparing to take their place as spiritual preachers, and their scope of activity was determined by their positions as professors at German universities, primarily located in small towns, and therefore far from the main centers of political and industrial life. Hence the somewhat theological and abstract character of their works, which, firstly, could not tolerate either direct hostility to the religion that prevailed among the French Encyclopedists, or even the indifference to it that shone through the reverent attitude of the Bacons, Lockes, and Humes in England—men for whom secular concerns had already pushed religious questions into the background. Since Protestantism attempted to link the church question with the tasks of secular society, for thinkers who had developed on the basis of these habits of thought, the relationship of secular knowledge to sacred tradition and of scientific methods to religious thought were the most important questions, and the main victory of thought had to be achieved on this basis, in order to deal with those inherited hypocritical compromises between belief and understanding, between religion and science, which had become ingrained, as it were, into the very essence of Protestant theology. But German idealism, faced with precisely this historical demand, set itself another, and a dual one. First, it intended to fulfill the task of science on a broader scale than empirical and mathematical knowledge had achieved. It hoped to do this by solving not only the problems of the latter, but also those it was incapable of solving. Second, idealism intended to provide humanity, beyond religious tradition, with a complex of idealistic products that would, for adherents of the new teachings, replace the previous religions with their fantastical world, elevating the believer above the everyday tribulations of life and providing spiritual help and consolation in moments of powerlessness and oppression in the struggle of life. Idealism declared itself the highest science and at the same time sought to take the place of religion. {In "Hegelism" of 1858-59, I directly called this teaching

a religion, but this, of course, is not accurate, since there always remains a significant difference between metaphysical teaching and religious preaching. Attempts by the former to play the role of the latter have occurred more than once, but they could not be successful.}.

In the teaching of Immanuel Kant, on the eve of the French Revolution, idealism actually emerged as an attempt at a more
broad science. He rejected metaphysics, placing it on the same level as the dreams of visionaries. He denied any possibility for man to penetrate the world of substances, "things in themselves," through theoretical thought. He offered man a purely scientific task—to establish the limits of possible knowledge. He attempted to develop a strictly scientific and at the same time elevating theory of moral duty and outlined the sociological task that social forms should be conditioned by the moral demands of the individual. But the events of this turbulent period weighed on the thinking of his contemporaries and provoked, especially in Germany, in the name of national indignation, a reaction against all elements of thought and life associated with the French Revolution. Under this influence, German idealism increasingly distanced itself from the tasks posed by Kant. From his teaching, in particular, developed those elements that provided the basis for new metaphysical speculations and made possible the development of methods of thinking most closely related to a religious mood or the ecstasy of an artist. The teachings of the elder Fichte and Schelling emphasized the possibility of penetrating the world of essences with thought. At the same time that Fichte was calling on German youth to fight against Napoleon's European dictatorship, he also inspired them with a metaphysical picture of the process by which the independent self of human thought creates from itself the entire conceivable world and, in its creative "work," is the initiator of truth and goodness. Unfolding before his enthusiastic students in his fragmentary works a broad horizon of natural phenomena and ancient myths, united by a bold thought, the young philosopher of Romanticism, Schelling, introduced the arbitrariness of artistic creativity into his philosophical construction, seducing his contemporaries Goethe and Schiller precisely with the aesthetic side of his "beginnings," which almost never had an "end." Like a true Romantic, he moved carefree throughout his long life from one worldview to another, until finally, in 1841, he ascended, like a ghost of extinct idealism, to the Berlin pulpit as a preacher of the "positive philosophy of revelation," just as other Romantics found refuge in the bosom of Catholicism.

But the culmination of German idealism, with its vast task, as indicated above, was the teaching of Hegel, who grasped this task most profoundly and attempted to resolve it with all the perfection accessible to the point of view on which German idealism stood. Without deeming it necessary to go into detail here, I will limit myself to the most fundamental elements of his teaching and to what is touched upon in Karl Marx's article.

Hegel inherited from his idealist predecessors the conviction that thought can penetrate the essence of things. He returned to the scientific side of idealism, to the demand to understand all that exists through a rigorous method, which for him was a scientific method. He created a method whose essence consisted in a specific technique for developing concepts from the most general and abstract to the most complex and concrete. The most robust and definite concepts and forms of previous teachings on thought, nature, man, and society lost their stability under the corrosive influence of the dialectic of the new philosophy, becoming merely transitory phases, prepared by other concepts and forms and preparing for still further phases of development. But for Hegel, this was not merely the development of the concept of being; It

was, at the same time, a process of development of being itself, beginning with logical categories, moving on to the real laws of nature, and ending with the historical categories of human life, all culminating in that understanding of logic, nature, and history contained in the philosophy of unconditional idealism, namely, Hegel's philosophy. And Hegel not only sketched the plan for this edifice. He executed it. His unifying thought arranged all logical devices, all natural phenomena, all historical catastrophes, all the products of artistic, religious, and metaphysical creativity on the numerous steps of the long staircases of the three main sections of his system. He did not oppose his teaching to others: he absorbed all others into his teaching, which turned out to be nothing more than unthought-out elements of a single process, encompassed only by Hegelism in all its phases. Having understood everything, Hegelism could say that it had fulfilled the task of the highest science. Having constructed a magnificent encyclopedic edifice of thought, he accomplished an architectural feat that was admirable for people of the aesthetic persuasion, not to mention the remarkable application of philosophy to questions of art that he gave in one of the special courses of his Berlin lectures. Finally, in the majestic presentation of the absolute spirit, developing in nature and history according to the laws of the dialectical process of human thought, in the indication of the absolutely correct solution of all questions of thought, the clarification of all the concerns of life by understanding both one and the other according to an infallible method as elements of a comprehensive truth, Hegelism appeared to its adherents as a sure aid in the impotence of thought and in the turmoil of life, capable of completely replacing the aid of
ь of previous beliefs. By calming both the moral impulses of the individual and the discontent of society, in understanding the rationality of all reality, had he not fulfilled the task of the most refined religion? To these virtues, which captivated the strongest and most remarkable minds, for the majority, in the reactionary era of the first decades of our century, was added another attractive virtue. A completely independent, logical process of developing the unconditional spirit in religious forms naturally emerged in the Berlin lectures on the "philosophy of religion" to those propositions that constituted the main dogmatic framework of Prussian state theology of that era. While recognizing as rational a historical reality consistent with the categories of the "philosophy of right," this work somehow fatally ambiguously arose, on the basis of which one could easily assume that precisely the pitiful reality that the Germans saw around them in those sad years was a rational reality.

And yet, history did not stand still. The era of weariness following the storms of revolution and the Napoleonic wars was passing. Among the southern European and American Romance nations, a struggle for independence was underway. It was against these unrests, occurring among secondary peoples, and against the remnants of German liberalism that could be gleaned from the teachings of Kant and Fichte, that professors like Fries, persecuted by Hegel, directed Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Right." This work appeared in 1821 and formed the subject of his university lectures in 1821-22, 1822-23, and 1824-25. Hegel believed he had smashed every contradiction. But history had a surprise in store for him. The July Revolution broke out and echoed with more or less significant explosions throughout Europe. A turmoil of thought began in Germany as well. Even among his students (especially the lawyer Hans), Hegel noticed that the "understanding of freedom" had not suppressed the "lower" phases of the desire for freedom. He rescheduled a course on the "philosophy of law" for the winter semester of 1831-32. But the course of unconscious natural processes overturned this

decision. The supreme representative of German idealistic metaphysics died of cholera on November 14, 1831.

The authority of the great teacher no longer interfered with interpretations and discord within the school. All students accepted his demand to understand all that exists and be satisfied only with its full understanding. Philosophy, with its dialectical method, was recognized as the highest and dominant weapon of thought. Everything that was real, according to its construction, was also rational and should rule over lower elements. But what exactly, in the existing facts and forms, was real and not illusory? What, therefore, was rational and should rule? The teacher presented a method that was undoubtedly correct, in the opinion of his disciples, but did he always apply it fully, did he always clearly express the necessary conclusions? Were the dogmas of official Prussian theology truly the necessary, highest products of the application of the dialectical method to religious thought? Were the political forms of Germany truly representative of something real—and therefore also rational—and not phantoms to be dispelled in the name of reason? Finally, in the name of that very dialectical method, applied to the very foundations of Hegel's construction, could one not understand something else by the development of the unconditional spirit? According to the teacher, this unconditional spirit first, in its divine tranquility, created a series of logical categories; then objectified itself in the laws of nature; and finally, on the basis of the latter, became increasingly conscious of itself in the personal, social, and historical evolution of man. Was not a slight modification here, in the name of a more rigorous criticism, possible and necessary? Was not the evolution of unconscious matter into a conscious personality and into progressive history concealed under the formula of the unconditional spirit? Didn't materialism constitute the true and rational foundation of the entire idealistic construct, and couldn't the entire majestic edifice of nature and history be better and more fully understood from this perspective? If the "unconditional spirit" (or "god," as Hegel sometimes expressed it) fully recognizes itself as such only in man at the highest stage of social and philosophical evolution, then shouldn't the thought of man, who has reached this stage, be regarded as the sole divine principle, whose entire divinity lies in his theoretical understanding and in his practical creation of rational social forms?

Almost immediately after Hegel's death, discord within the school began and quickly intensified over the true understanding of his teachings in relation to religion and politics. As early as 1826, Ferdinand Christian Baur had been developing the foundations of the famous Tübingen School of Theology in Tübingen, which introduced the most rigorous criticism into the history of the earliest period of Christianity. In 1835, a book by David Strauss was published from the same Tübingen, which stirred the entire theological world, since it destroyed with one blow, through strict criticism, both the orthodox tradition about the life of Christ and the rationalistic interpretation of this tradition. This life

, the foundation of Christian doctrine even in the most liberal schools of Protestantism, was exposed as a collection of myths. The controversy over this book marked the final collapse of Hegelianism. In 1836, its left wing received its own organ, the Gallic Annals (Hallesche Jahrbücher, later Deutsche J.), under the direction of Arnold Ruge. In them, the banner of inexorable criticism was raised, and Ludwig Feuerbach proclaimed already in "No. 7: "Freedom is necessary, philosophy is necessary, but not Hegel, not Fichte, not Kant." In 1841, his "Essence of Christianity" appeared, followed by "The Essence of Religion." In Christian teaching, as in all religions, the moral demands of man were indicated as the source of all

religious creativity. The highest being for man turned out to be "man." A long series of compromises that took place in the environment of Protestantism between the religious and scientific systems of thought, a series that in German idealism had just achieved, apparently, the most brilliant success, led to the sharpest opposition between these two areas of thought as the only logical conclusion from the critical development of this very idealism. And from under the majestic cover of idealistic metaphysics, the essence of a directly opposite teaching was released. Ludwig Feuerbach declared himself a materialist. {I allow myself to think that the philosophical teachings of Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and their associates are so essentially different from those teachings that in earlier times were called "materialistic" that it was almost in vain that they retained this term, but this is not the place to prove this opinion, and since they themselves retained the term, it must be applied to them.}.

But the criticism of the "left" Hegelians did not stop at the area of religion. The "critique of religion" was, as Karl Marx said in the opening lines of the article, the translation of which is before the readers, "completed in its essential content." It was inevitable to move on to a critique of social conditions. The era of reaction read in Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" only its most conservative propositions and conclusions. The German historical school of law, which already in 1814, with Savigny, denied the modern era the right to change the legal forms of society, came forward precisely in 1830 with the first volume of Stahl's great work6 as preaching the most decisive reaction. Feuerbach aimed his attacks at this "Shylock-servant with his Christian-German bill of exchange" {Stahl was a baptized Jew who became a defender of the darkest Christian orthodoxy with the usual zeal of renegades. He called his work "The Philosophy of Right from a Historical Point of View" (1830-37).}, in the words of Karl Marx. It was necessary, in his own words, to declare "war on the German order"7. But first of all it was necessary to determine one's attitude towards the book of the teacher, on which conservatives and reactionaries relied. Arnold Ruge began to publish in his journal a series of embittered articles against Prussia, which he later collected under the title "Prussia and Reaction". The "Gallic Chronicles" were banned, but were revived in Saxony in 1842 as the "German Chronicles". They already Arnold Ruge criticized Hegel's "Philosophy of Right." He found a contradiction in the fact that Hegel recognized as rational a state devoid of reality, because it is not yet a state and does not want to become one, not containing within itself the forms of free and at the same time legitimate development. Ruge pointed to the duty of the philosopher "to throw truth into the world like a ferment"; to the impossibility for him to limit himself to "understanding" and rest on it; to the dissatisfaction that is caused by the consciousness that the existing reality is not yet a rational reality; to the need in this case not only to understand, but to do something. Ruge argued that the times require criticism, especially in application to all historical phenomena, since the historical process itself is a constant criticism. Each era contrasts the existing reality of its time with the concept of the proper reality and, in its desire to improve the first, passes on to another, higher era. In the same year of 1842, Karl Marx became the head of the "Rheinische Zeitung," the radicalism of which led to its closure in 1843. Then, together with Arnold Ruge, he founded the "German-French Chronicles", where he published an article, the translation of which is now presented to Russian readers. Here, the destructive Hegelian dialectic was directed not only at the political world of Germany, which for Marx was an "anachronism" in view of the more advanced political development of France. Behind political questions, the "main task of the new time" is indicated - "the relationship of industry, and the

economic world in general, to the political world". The author declares the "German order" to be "below criticism", "below the level of history", something "as contemptible as it is despised", pointing out at the same time that they, as a "thorn" of the experiences of the old regime, are still "seated in the body of the modern state" of the "renewed peoples". But in these "renewed" states themselves, as in the German philosophical "pon
"in the name of the state," Marx points to the constitutional "corruption of the body." The representative of the future phase of history, its new era, was to appear, as he foresees, a class in relation to which "truth in general is violated" and which "organizes the entire structure of human life on the basis of social freedom." This class turned out to be the proletariat, and it was to realize this task of the future. Germany, in the political conditions of its life, had to "skip" the phase experienced by the "renewed peoples" in practical life, which, according to Marx, it experienced only in theoretical life, in order to solve this task of the future. For Karl Marx, in Hegel's "Philosophy of Right," Germany had a theoretical phenomenon that corresponded to the practical political movement that took place in France, and, by criticizing this highest product of German thought, he simultaneously, with the help of the "Philosophy of Right," had to show the inconsistency of the existing political system in Germany, and in criticizing the "Philosophy of Right," had to discover the shortcomings of the bourgeois system, which had achieved its best results in the political revolutions of France. The transition of German thought from idealism to that "materialism" which, rejecting absolute truth, sought truth "for man" and declared that for it the highest being was "man himself," was for Karl Marx inextricably linked with the transition from a political system that represented an "anachronism," through the most "fundamental" revolution, to a system whose economic foundations would determine its political gains. This revolution would stand as far above the previous political revolutions of France as Feuerbach's anthropological realism stood above Hegel's metaphysical idealism, from which it developed as the highest phase. From the last lines of the article, it is clear that Karl Marx expected the first impetus for this revolution to come from France.
But the struggle for the triumph of the proletariat over the system of politically renewed nations with its constitutional malaise did not make Karl Marx in 1844 any less indifferent to The shortcomings of the "German order" against which he and Arnold Ruge had "declared war." They were "below criticism," but criticism was forced to play the role of "executioner" in relation to them. They were an "enemy" that had to be "destroyed," knowing that "material force must be overthrown only by material force." This was precisely one part of the task of the critique of the new philosophy, tasks whose "solution" was "possible only through practice." Incidentally, alongside the "destruction of the proletariat," this also encompassed the transition of "philosophy into reality," which was the motto of the new doctrine. Hegelism, which had previously appeared as a guardian of the existing social order and had already become a doctrine of political revolution in the Gallic Annals, in Marx's article unfurled the banner of political-social revolution.

For Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, the moment in which Marx's article appeared can reveal many similarities with what our homeland represents today. The Russian autocracy, in comparison with the political situation not only of the most advanced countries in the world in

this respect, but even in relation to Bismarck's Germany, represents a more ugly "anachronism" than Prussia in 1844 compared with France at the same time. Likewise, in relation to this ugly anachronism, the very denial of which "has managed to gather a layer of dust in the historical archives of the peoples of our time," every educated Russian, everyone who loves the Russian people, can say that the Russian autocracy is "below criticism," that it is nothing other than an "enemy" that arouses only "indignation," an enemy whom one must strive not to "refute," but to "destroy." But in exactly the same way, in Russia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are faced with the task of not only accomplishing this task, long ago accomplished by all the nations of Europe. Russia must win not only political and civil rights, to which she "must strive as for liberation from her real constraints"; It must also "leapfrog" those political forms which other nations have acquired in the illusory assumption that salvation lies in these political forms. The imperial autocracy is an "enemy" with whom no developed Russian can make a deal. But for a Russian who stands at the level of contemporary world concerns, this is far from the only enemy. Throughout Europe, they now realize that parliamentarism, in the form in which we see it in contemporary states, precisely as a form of class (though not estate) rule, is the source of dangerous social ills. Liberated Russia must "leapfrog" this obstacle, class parliamentarism as one of the manifestations of the capitalist order, in order to rise to the level of contemporary social tasks. Socialists in Russia, as elsewhere, are convinced that only the organization of urban and rural workers, into whose hands the tools of labor must pass, can be the foundation of a system that is at the level of these

Problems. There are many developed minds in Russia who don't go so far, but who nevertheless don't close their eyes to the painful phenomena of European class parliamentarism. Knowing full well that imperial autocracy is, in any case, a shameful and senseless political form, they seek political forms that eliminate these painful phenomena, without reaching socialist solutions. There are also "enthusiasts" in Russia who present a certain analogy with those who sought German freedom "in the primeval Teutonic forests." These are the extreme "populists" of various stripes. Russian socialists are convinced that careful consideration of the historical formulation of the tasks should lead all developed and sincere Russians to a socialist solution to the question. However, they respect all who, in one form or another, recognize the political duty of "destroying" autocracy, an "enemy" that stands "below criticism," and the task of promoting the organization in our country of a system free from the shortcomings of class parliamentarism. For socialists, as well as for non-socialists who have achieved an understanding of the contemporary tasks of history, "this is the question."

The task Karl Marx set for Germany in 1844 has still not been fulfilled. In its political forms, it nevertheless presents something monstrous and anachronistic in comparison with the advanced powers of Europe. However, enormous concessions to the new demands of the times have been made there, too. The existence of major "remnants of the old regime" in Germany is conditioned by the enormous political predominance that representatives of conservatism temporarily granted Germany. The intoxication of political power is too natural a phenomenon in history to be resented. Germany has already paid a rather high price for it, especially for a country that until recently occupied such a high, one might even say leading, position among European nations in the realm of thought; it has paid with a significant decline in the average level of thought, precisely among its leading minds. But intoxications pass if they do not destroy nations. The strong organization of German Social Democrats and its growth, despite all

persecution, are healthy symptoms promising a speedy recovery. And then Germany will once again face the same task that Karl Marx set for it nearly half a century ago—the task of "carrying out the revolution in the most thorough manner," facing not the Germany of Metternich and Friedrich Wilhelm IV, but a Germany that has survived the Frankfurt Parliament and the Baden massacre, the preaching of Lassalle and the military empire of Bismarck, the "cultural struggle" against Catholicism and the 1878 law against the socialists.

Russian autocracy, with its forms "below criticism," possesses neither the aura of military glory and achieved power with which Bismarck and Moltke surrounded present-day Germany, nor the illusory "rationality" with which Hegel's externally understood and somewhat ambiguous "Philosophy of Right" clothed the Prussia of the 1830s. Russians have often had to not only "exclaim indignantly" against the barbaric forms of autocracy and its no less barbaric actions. They have also had to blush in the presence of the limitations, stupidity, and incompetence of this autocracy's accomplices, even from the standpoint of its governmental interests. It was not only outrageous but sometimes pitiable. Its "reasonableness" never occurred to any sincere and developed thinker to defend. Its essential absurdity, its place "below criticism," are self-evident propositions. Its defenders can say only one thing: under the given conditions, it exists, therefore it has a reason to exist; Russians do not demand or achieve better, therefore they are not worth better. The majority of Russians must listen to this argument with a blush on their cheeks, since each of them has no answer to the question: what have you done as an "indignant" individual to express your demand for something better? The small minority of the liberal Decembrists of 1825, the humanitarian writers of the 1850s and 1860s, the socialist propagandists of the early 1870s, and the socialist Narodnaya Volya members of the late 1870s have nothing to be ashamed of. They failed to win the best for their fatherland; they made mistakes and paid for them; but they declared their demands for something better; they stood before history as the sole element of progress in Russia, as people for whom the imperial autocracy was an "enemy" that must be "destroyed." The task of all developed Russians is to continue, in new forms determined by the times, to express their demands in the dual form in which they stand today: the demand for free political forms based on a social system that eliminates the shortcomings of the current Western class parliamentarism.

In one respect, it seems, the contemporary task of developed Russians differs entirely from the task Marx posed for Germany in 1844. There the discussion was about the struggle against idealistic Hegelism in the name of philosophy “for man”, which sets as its fundamental position that “

"the root of everything for man lies in man himself." This new philosophy naturally emerged, as a more thought-out result, from the entire evolution of idealism in its most perfect forms. Karl Marx in his "Introduction" linked the "transition" of the new philosophy "into reality" with a social revolution, "the destruction of the proletariat." He seemed to deny the possibility of this destruction without the associated "transition of this philosophy into reality." And this, of course, first presupposed the development of such a philosophy in theory; it presupposed, therefore, a lively struggle of philosophical views and the triumph in them of the real element over the religious and metaphysical. Thus, a whole series of phenomena in the theoretical sphere was presupposed, which took place in Germany, but was completely alien to our homeland.

The process of struggle between religious, metaphysical, and real-anthropological ideas in the history of German thought was a consequence of Protestantism and its role in the history of

human thought. This process, in such a form, cannot be expected where this lining did not exist. Socialism in France, in England, in the south of Europe had different foundations, a different history, and had no need for Hegelian philosophy with its religious criticism to establish its foundations. This is also true for our homeland.

Orthodoxy never played a prominent social role. It was the servant of the Byzantine emperors, the Moscow tsars, and the St. Petersburg autocrats. It abandoned its flock to the practices of witchcraft and ceremony inherited from prehistoric times, without introducing any of the living elements adopted by Christianity from Greek philosophy: neither the demand to organize personal life and society on the basis of conviction, nor the desire to disseminate as widely as possible that conviction in which the individual sees truth. Orthodoxy was and remains a teaching of ritual, without influencing the structure of human thought or the embodiment of this thought in life. When it began to develop into a schism with its moral and everyday demands, the ruling classes in Russia were already under the influence of modern European history with its purely secular demands, and for them, Orthodoxy again remained a form of ritual. It never needed to seek compromises with science and morality, as Protestantism did, since Orthodoxy remained outside of life and outside of morality, with its ancient form of custom not subject to criticism. In it, it was necessary to struggle not with the hypocritical compromises of thought, but with its complete inactivity. Therefore, thought in Russia, in its progressive aspirations, saw and sees in Orthodoxy not an intellectual element, but a hostile, false one, which must be conquered, opposing it with theoretical and moral truth; and for it this is an ordinary form, from which man in his striving for development must get rid of, as from any custom that hinders historical life. An understanding of the ugliness of autocracy, just as the assimilation of the fatality of the class struggle under all political forms of modern society, could be developed in Russia apart from any theological struggle. The position on the "criticism of religion" as "the first premise of all criticism", which is entirely fair for Protestant countries, was modified for Rus' in the sense that the religious structure of Russian society, in its social significance, remained even more "below criticism" than Russian autocracy; it did not give rise to any "sprout of life under the skull" in Russian life, and by its intellectual inactivity, it actually carried out a more thorough critique of religious thought for the developed Russian than the most skillful criticism could have done in theory.

In our homeland, political and economic criticism did not have to seek support in any solid philosophical system or be developed in dispute with anything similar. Autocracy, serfdom, and developing industry were facts in Russia that did not seek any theoretical foundations or justifications. We had paid professors of philosophy, like the current rector of St. Petersburg University.8 There were isolated Kantians, Schellingians, Hegelians, pessimists, positivists; but these individuals had no influence on public thought; we do not have a Russian philosophical school. developed9, and almost every thinking person in our homeland had to build his worldview in the least convenient, but most natural way, uniting, as he could, without any tradition, the facts of knowledge, belief, life's inclinations and tasks. Very often, this philosophical work was carried out almost unconsciously; very often it was very disorganized, full of gaps and contradictions. But against the pressure of those metaphysical giants who developed in Europe, Russian thought did not have to struggle. It perceived each new fact of science and history in its freshness, without putting it through the prism of foreign, adopted philosophy. Hegelism alone,

with its enchanting power, temporarily exerted a certain collective influence on Russian guiding minds. But, fortunately
This was already during the era of its discord and the development of a critical trend.
As a result of actual "indignation" against the autocracy, the spirit of political revolution also penetrated Russia. As a de facto recognition of the "violation of all truth" regarding the working class by capitalist economy, socialism also took root in our homeland on the basis of "indignation" caused by the archaic institution of serfdom. The tasks of political and social revolution confront the developed Russian with the same persistence with which they confronted and confront the European and American. For us to grasp them, we did not need the preceding phases of religious disputes and successive metaphysical constructs. Nevertheless, even in our country, the triumph of political freedom, in connection with the demands of a humane life for the masses on a sound economic foundation, requires a specific philosophical basis, although most people do not notice any sophisticated philosophy here. Its first requirement is to eliminate all products of religious and metaphysical creativity; The Orthodox tradition has weaned us from the former; the absence of philosophical schools, which our police state has always viewed with hostility, has protected us from the latter. The second requirement: in understanding things, rely on scientific facts, to the extent that science recognizes them as reliable or probable; in practical life, develop a conviction and consistently implement it. From this perspective, recognizing autocracy as an "enemy" and striving to "destroy" it is a self-evident truth, since this autocracy is both logically deformed and historically condemned. From this perspective, socialist ideals also rise with invincible persuasiveness, relying on the fact of class struggle, on the scientific critique of capitalism, on the moral demand for a more just system, and on the historical task of solidarity among all working humanity. For those who recognize here the work of unifying thought on scientific and moral material, this is the only scientific philosophy, requiring not only clear understanding but also dedicated action in the name of this understanding. For those who find the word "philosophy" somewhat unpleasant and scholastic, it is life itself, with its burning questions and the demand for consistency in their resolution.

October 22, 1887

NOTES

The "Preface" is dated October 22, 1887, by Lavrov and published in the book: K. Marx. "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", Geneva, Published by the Narodnaya Volya Circle (Socialist Library), 1887. This is the first translation into a foreign language of the famous work of K. Marx, which was written at the end of 1843 (see K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. I) and in which, according to V. I. Lenin, "Marx already appears as a revolutionary, proclaiming "merciless criticism of everything that exists" and in particular "criticism of weapons", appealing to the masses and to the proletariat" (V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, Vol. 26, pp. 47-48). The translator's name was not given, but as B. I. Reinstein informed the author of these notes in the spring of 1936, the translation was completed last, in the 1870s. B. I. Reinstein was a member of the Circle of Young Narodnaya Volya members at the time and produced the aforementioned translation for its members. A handwritten copy of the translation,

containing significant edits by Lavrov, has been preserved at the TsGAOR (f. 1762, op. 2, unit 386); a photocopy of the first page of the manuscript, published in this volume, provides an idea of these edits.

G. V. Plekhanov responded to the book's publication with a review in Sotsial-Demokrat (Geneva, 1888). Noting that the translation of Marx's article "is lame in many places," but the book was published "rather neatly," he made a number of comments on Lavrov's "Preface." Plekhanov generally approved of the first, most voluminous part of the “Preface,” where Lavrov explains the historical character and significance of German idealistic philosophy, finding that it “explains much in Marx’s article itself.” "Even if it is impossible," Plekhanov further noted, "to agree unconditionally with what Mr. Lavrov says in it, then in any case its content does not give rise to any misunderstandings. Not so in the second part. Its content is obscure and "fraught" with misunderstandings. The author writes, for example, that "Russia has to obtain not only political and civil rights... it must also "leap over" those political forms that have been acquired by other nations in the illusory assumption that all salvation lies in these political forms" (G. V. Plekhanov, Works, Vol. IV, 1923, p. 266). Having emphasized that by political forms here is meant "parliamentarism," which is, as Lavrov himself says, "class domination," "a manifestation of the capitalist order," Plekhanov continues: "We cannot clarify for ourselves how Mr. Lavrov understands the "leaps" that lie ahead for Russia." Sometimes we reason like this: "liberated" Russia must "leapfrog," and modern Russia must "liberate itself." Once it succeeds in doing so, it will move on and begin the struggle against "class parliamentarism."

That is, it will begin to "leapfrog." If this is how Mr. Lavrov understands this issue, then he is, of course, absolutely right; but then why talk about leapfrogging? After all, without leapfrogging, it is impossible to devise any other path for Russia's social development. But sometimes it seems to us that, in Mr. Lavrov's opinion, it is precisely modern, not yet "liberated" Russia... that must "leapfrog" to forms of social relations in which the tools of labor will pass "into the hands of the workers." And if this latter assumption is correct, then we will put the following considerations to Mr. Lavrov... It is impossible for us to "leapfrog" "class parliamentarism." But it is also ridiculous to regret this. Our modern absolutism is the source of such "dangerous social diseases" that, in comparison with it, "class parliamentarism" would be a huge step forward in social development. Socialists only need to ensure that the working class, which alone can deal a mortal blow to absolutism, achieves that share of political freedom that “class parliamentarism” gives to workers in the most advanced countries of the West. This freedom is necessary for them to fight against bourgeois society and the parliamentarism inevitable in such a society" (ibid., pp. 267-269).

Lavrov's "Preface" together with Marx's work was reprinted in the journal "The General Library, a fortnightly illustrated literary and political magazine" (No. 10, August 20, 1906, St. Petersburg, pp. 3-30). In preparation for this edition, the "Preface" was verified with the manuscript (TsGAOR, f. 1762, op. 2, unit of storage 386).

1 This refers to the "Union of the Socialist Literary Fund," which was founded in 1887 in Zurich and, together with the Narodnaya Volya circle, published, in addition to Marx's work mentioned above, "The Economic Doctrine of Karl Marx in a Popular Exposition by K. Kautsky," Geneva, 1888, with a preface and notes by K. Tarasov (N. S. Rusanov). This publication is designated as the "first issue" of the Socialist Library, whereas at that time it was K. Marx's "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right". In the autumn of 1888, S. M. Ginzburg circulated in St.

Petersburg an appeal for the organization of a "Fund" abroad, of which Lavrov was the treasurer. The members of the "Fund" were Dembo, Rudevich, Gnatovsky, Govorukhin and the "Emancipation of Labor" group (see V. I. Nevsky, "From "Land and Freedom" to the "Emancipation of Labor" group, Moscow, 1930, p. 243). Soon the "Fund" was divided into two parts: the Narodnaya Volya group and the "Emancipation of Labor" group, since the members of the latter were against the charter of the "Fund", which gave Lavrov the right of decisive vote on matters of printing. books (see G. Gukovsky's letter to the "Emancipation of Labor" group, February 7, 1888, in "Plekhanov's Literary Heritage," Vol. 1, Moscow, 1934, p. 232).
2 This refers to M. A. Bakunin's article "Reaction in Germany. Letter from a Frenchman" in the journal "Deutsche Jahrbücher," 1842, Nos. 247-251.
3 Infâme (French) -- dishonest, vile, disgusting. This is how Voltaire called the Catholic Church, putting forward the slogan: "Écrasez l'infâme!" (Crush the vermin!)
4 Fries, Jakob Friedrich (1773-1843), professor of philosophy at Heidelberg, then at Jena. Developing Kant's philosophy, Fries added to it the principle of systematics, justifying it with the help of the "natural doctrine of the human spirit." Fries called the latter "philosophical anthropology," from which his system received the name anthropologism. Main works: "Neue Kritik der Vernunft (New Critique of Reason)" Heidelberg, 1806-1807; "Handbuch der psychischen Antropologie (Handbook of Psychical Anthropology)" Jena, 1820-1821.
5 Baur, Ferdinand Christian (1792-1860), liberal Protestant theologian, head of the Tübingen school (to which Strauss, Schwegler, and others belonged). historical criticism of the Gospels, tracing the struggle in them between the freer teaching of "St. Paul" and the narrower views of "St. Peter". Main works: "Symbolic und Milhologie oder die Naturreligien des Altertums (Symbolic and Mythological Studies or Natural Religions of Antiquity)", Stuttgart, 1824-1825; "Paulus des Apostol Jesu Cliristi (Paul, Apostle of Jesus Christ)", Stuttgart, 1845; "Critical Studies on the Canonical Gospels, Their Relationship to Each Other, Their Origin and Character (Critical Studies on the Canonical Gospels, Their Relationship to Each Other, Their Origin and Character)", Tübingen, 1847.
6 Savigny, Friedrich Karl (1779-1861) - German professor of law, conservative, monarchist, in 1842-1848 was Prussian minister, the revolutionary upsurge of 1848 forced him to resign; one of the leaders of the historical school of law. His work "On the Recognition of Our Time and the Field of Legislation and Jurisprudence" (Heidelberg, 1814) gained particular fame in Germany. Stahl, Friedrich Julius (1802-1861) -- German philosopher, jurist, and economist, from 1832 professor in Erlangen and Würzburg, from 1840 in Berlin; contributor to the reactionary "Kreuzzeitung". Main works: "Philosophy of Law" (Heidelberg, 1830-1837); "Die Revolution und d
ie Konstitutelle Monarchie (Revolution and Constitutional Monarchy), Berlin, 1848; "Der Protestantismus als politisches Prinzip (Protestantism as a Political Principle), Berlin, 1853.
7 K. Marx in his article "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" characterized the historical school of law as follows: "The school which justifies the baseness of today by the baseness of yesterday, which declares every cry of the serfs against the whip to be rebellious, provided only that this whip is the old, inherited, historical whip; the school to which history shows, like the God of Israel to his servant Moses, only its a posteriori—this historical school of law would therefore have invented German history, if it were not itself an invention of German history. "A real Shylock, but a lackey Shylock, swears by every pound of flesh cut from

the heart of the people, swears by his bill of exchange, his historical bill of exchange, his Christian-German bill of exchange" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. 1, p. 416). In the same article, Marx declared war on the "German order": "War is a must! These orders are below the level of history, they are beneath all criticism..." (ibid.).
8 The current rector of St. Petersburg University is Mikhail Ivanovich Vladislavlev (1840-1890), a reactionary known for his attempt at a theoretical "justification" for opportunism.
9 This assertion by P. L. Lavrov is not characteristic of his views on the history of Russian philosophy as a whole. Lavrov himself speaks of the Sovremennik school, of the school of Chernyshevsky, who managed to create a current of thought that prevailed among the majority of the young Russian intelligentsia (see this volume, p. 665). The history of the development of Russian philosophy has had original philosophical schools and trends. Lenin had precisely this in mind when he pointed out that "the main trends of progressive social thought in Russia have, fortunately, a solid materialistic tradition" (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 45, p. 24). --

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